This arises as the membership of the EE group is reduced when the EU members are removed, causing the remaining members to become highly overrepresented. This effect could be mitigated, however, if implementation of RM were bundled with an appropriate rebalancing of the allocation of seats to regions. As may be seen in Figs. One structural reform does succeed in weakly dominating Present : RR. Under RR , the five existing regional groupings would reduce to four. This structural reform leaves voting rights, and therefore efficiency, unchanged, but leads to substantial improvements in equity.
The bulk of the equity effect is seen in Fig. Only one structural reform dominates Present : Veto —. Under Veto —, two PMs would need to vote against a resolution for this to constitute an automatic veto. By reducing the blocking power of each PM, Veto — increases the a priori probability of a resolution being approved to 2. The improvement in equity is attributable to discernible improvements in both CE and RE. The former effect arises as Veto — succeeds in diluting the share of expected voting power held by the PMs through reducing their voting power ; the latter arises as the overrepresentation of EE and the WEOG is eased.
In summary, Veto — aside, the types of structural reform under consideration yield modest, and often negative, effects on equity and efficiency. There are, thus, diminishing equity returns to expansion.
Services on Demand
Efficiency, however, is decreasing, and at an increasing rate, in the size of the UNSC. Thus, incremental expansions of the UNSC generate increasingly large efficiency losses, and increasingly small equity gains. In spite of these qualitative similarities, however, we do see some important quantitative differences in the way expansion interacts with each structural reform, as we shall discuss below.
One structural reform expansion-dominates all others: Veto —. In this sense, this structural reform wins out among those we consider. Alongside Veto —, one other structural reform, RR , weakly dominates Present at each expansion. Note in Fig. In particular, if expansion is by six or more new members, RM —under which the EU votes as a single actor—achieves greater equity than does Present.
The other remarkable feature of the expansion lines in Fig. Last, we consider our results for the reform proposals. Only one reform proposal dominates Status quo : WV. Under WV two PMs must vote against a resolution for this to constitute a veto. Of the remaining reform proposals, bar EU , each improves upon equity relative to Status quo , but—because of the added difficulty of achieving the required level of consensus within an expanded body—worsens efficiency.
Helpfully—given the proliferation of reform proposals—it transpires that all but three of the reform proposals we consider can be demonstrated to be dominated and should, therefore, never be chosen. From Fig. As such, every expansion line and point estimate in Fig. The effects of altering the preference weights in the construction of our composite measure of equity may be inferred from Fig.
Although reform of the UNSC is one of the most pressing issues facing the international community, as yet no previous analysis has appraised the options for UNSC reform against formal equity and efficiency desiderata. In this paper, we attempted such an appraisal. This caveat notwithstanding, our approach does yield a rich set of predictions for the effects of a wide range of UNSC reform proposals. On the basis of our analysis, we concur that expansion at the levels currently under consideration will provide only modest improvements in equity, and will also come at the expense of efficiency, unless world leaders are also willing to lower the threshold for the proportion of members that must vote in favor of a resolution for it to pass.
By segregating the effects of structural reform from those owing to expansion, we also find that, in many cases, the types of deeper structural reforms being proposed are in fact counterproductive in respect of our metrics.
As such, in these cases, a reform purely of membership expansion would actually be preferable to expansion alongside structural reform. The most promising reform proposal among those we consider is one in which two Permanent Members PMs would have to cast votes against a resolution to block it WV. Its success owes to the fact that, by reducing the voting power of the PMs, it dilutes the distribution of expected voting power away from these countries. Regrettably, however, this reform proposal appears stymied in the short- and even medium-term, for no PM is willing to relinquish its right of veto, and the constitutional ability of the PMs to retain these powers seems impregnable.
On the other hand, despite their constitutional power, Fassbender argues that, if the rest of the world could agree on a common way forward, the PMs would have little choice but to concede ground. The preceding point notwithstanding, it has not been our purpose to offer our own reform proposal, merely to examine those put forward by actors within the UN itself.
While these avenues must await a proper treatment, we believe that the present contribution at least clarifies what little is achieved by the reform proposals presently on the table. See Appendix 3 for the full membership of each of the regional groups excluding PMs. As, in the context of region equity, we are specifically interested in understanding the representation of regions as cohesive entities it is appropriate in this context to disregard the possibility—which might be very real in practice — that countries assigned to the UNSC in Stage 2 of the RDP might break ranks and vote according to the preference of their own citizens rather than according to the outcome of the regional ballot.
This point underscores the need to understand both country and region concepts of equity. The existing UNSC and the reforms to it we consider may all be analyzed without requiring country voting power to be time-variant. This measure assumes that each voting possibility is chosen with equal probability, which as we shall subsequently comment on turns out not to apply to the Stage 3 vote. Indeed, were preferences actually uncorrelated within countries and regions, then these constructs would be arbitrary and we would not witness the fierce debates over regional and national representation that we actually observe in the UNSC reform debate.
Felsenthal and Machover , consider two further measures of efficiency: the absolute and relative sensitivity indices. As these typically correlate highly with PTA , however, we consider this measure only. See, e. Accordingly, there is widespread agreement on the need to expand the membership of the UNSC although by what degree is hotly disputed. We focus on the structural reforms associated with reform proposals that are sufficiently concrete to be simulated. We do this as, so far as we know, none of these reform proposals is under detailed consideration by UN members.
For more on the origins of this reform proposal, see Fassbender , p. Fassbender , p. As an observer, the EU has the right to speak at UNGA meetings and to present proposals agreed by EU members, but not the right to vote on resolutions and other substantive matters.
Precisely, we realize marginally more than , periods, but discard the very earliest periods. Hence, it requires a number of years before the elected UNSC becomes filled with members. The number of initial years we discard corresponds to twice the maximum term length. Note that, in Fig. There are two reasons for this. Most straightforwardly, some reform proposals combine more than one structural reform, and therefore appear somewhere between the relevant lines. Prior to the United Kingdom expressing in its intention to leave the EU, RM stood to deliver significant improvements to efficiency, for then the UK and France would have shared the EU veto, rather than both wielding separate vetoes, thereby reducing the number of veto actors from five at present to four.
United Nations Security Council Reform
The slight worsening against CE is because longer NPM terms favor countries with higher assignment probabilities at the expense of countries with lower assignment probabilities which are already underrepresented. To see this, suppose a country is always elected as a NPM when it is eligible. The San Francisco Declaration of ensures that a PM can veto questions of veto rights, for a PM exercises a veto on all non-procedural matters and also on whether a matter is to be deemed procedural or non-procedural see, e.
Specifically, we employ a lexicographic procedure in which, first, we identify the sets of sequences that makes maximally smooth the number of vacant seats per year within each region. Second, among these sets of sequences, we identify those that maximally smooth the total number of vacant seats across regions.
Last, if a unique set of sequences is not yet determined, a final choice is made according to a random draw from the remaining sequence sets. The Rotate structural reform is the introduction of ten regional rotating seats to replace the ten existing NPM seats. To analyze this structural reform, we draw, for each region, the countries one-by-one without replacement under a uniform distribution to determine the order of rotation.
It is straightforward to verify, however, that the proof of their Proposition 4 extends to the weak case. Gould thanks the University of Westminster for financial support. Skip to main content Skip to sections. Advertisement Hide. Download PDF.
It's time to expand the UN Security Council. But who gets a seat? - wohntadevige.ga
Reform of the United Nations Security Council: equity and efficiency. Open Access. First Online: 14 July We wish to measure, in an objective sense, the proximity of the UNSC under different reforms to our two equity concepts. This corresponds to the widely-used index of distortion , commonly attributed to Loosemore and Hanby It is helpful for the purposes of comparison between reforms to have a single composite measure of equity. Our main results are shown in Fig.
Reform of the United Nations Security Council
On the horizontal axis is our composite equity measure E , and on the vertical axis is our efficiency measure 2 PTA. Open image in new window. We note that the Weak Veto reform proposal is by no means the only way of weakening the veto right: other, potentially more acceptable, options that weaken the veto to a lesser extent might profitably be explored by world leaders.
On this point, Freixas , p. The reform did not come into effect until , however. Annan, K. New York: United Nations. Google Scholar. Barnett, M. Eyewitness to a genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Blum, Y. Proposals for UN Security Council reform. American Journal of International Law, 99 3 , — CrossRef Google Scholar. Bourantonis, D. History and politics of United Nations Security Council reform.
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